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Abstract
Purpose: We argue that the police have been adversely impacted by Ferguson-related negative
publicity in ways beyond the supposed increase in crime (e.g., reduced motivation and increased
perception of danger). Further, we suggest that organizational justice is a key factor that
influences officers’ sensitivity to such Ferguson effects.
Methods: We used a sample of 510 sheriff’s deputies surveyed 6 months after the incident in
Ferguson. We explored whether organizational justice is associated with deputies’ sensitivity to
several manifestations of the Ferguson effect using OLS and ordered logistic regression models.
Results: The results demonstrated that deputies who believed their supervisors were more
organizationally fair were less likely to feel unmotivated, perceive more danger, believe their
colleagues have been negatively impacted, or feel that US citizens and local residents have
become more cynical towards the police in the post-Ferguson era.
Conclusions: Police supervisors who use organizational justice as a guiding managerial
philosophy are more likely to shield their officers from the negative work-related outcomes that
can follow recent Ferguson-type publicity. Supervisors should be fair, objective, honest, and
respectful when dealing with their subordinates in order to communicate that the agency has their
back even when it may appear the community does not.
Keywords: policing, police management, organizational justice, Ferguson Effect
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Organizational Justice and Sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect
Over the last eighteen months, there has been much debate about the so-called “Ferguson
Effect” on US police. This idea holds that in response to heightened scrutiny of the police
following the fatal shooting of unarmed Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri in August 2014,
officers are less motivated to aggressively perform their duties and are pulling back from
proactive strategies. Proponents suggest that this “de-policing” will result in increased crime
rates throughout the US. The most robust empirical assessment of this argument to date recently
revealed that the Ferguson Effect has not caused increased crime across the US (Pyrooz, Decker,
Wolfe, & Shjarback, 2016; but see also Rosenfeld, 2016). While this evidence is good news and
puts to rest any worries of a nationwide crime wave (see Mac Donald, 2015), there may in fact
be other ways in which the Ferguson Effect manifests itself. For instance, research has shown
that negative publicity surrounding the police in the aftermath of Ferguson was associated with
lower levels of officer self-legitimacy (Nix & Wolfe, 2015) and reduced willingness of officers
to engage in community partnerships (Wolfe & Nix, 2016a). These are important findings
because extant research has demonstrated that officers with greater self-legitimacy are more
committed to using procedural justice with citizens (Bradford & Quinton, 2014) and less reliant
on physical force to gain compliance (Tankebe & Meško, 2015), while community partnerships
are an essential aspect of community and problem-oriented policing (Braga, Kennedy, Waring,
& Piehl, 2001; Gill, Weisburd, Telep, Vitter, & Bennet, 2014). Thus, while systematic crime rate
increases do not seem to be a direct consequence of the Ferguson Effect, there is reason to
believe that police officers have been adversely impacted by the Ferguson controversy (and
related incidents across the US), which in turn has implications for crime. In this way, sensitivity
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to the Ferguson Effect can be viewed as a negative work-related outcome for officers, their
supervisors and agencies, and the communities they serve.
The problem, however, is that we know very little about what is associated with officers’
sensitivity to such Ferguson Effects. In other words, what is it that makes a police officer more
or less likely to feel affected by negative publicity and public discontent stemming from
Ferguson? This is an important policy question for police agencies and command staff. What can
supervisors do to help prevent their officers from being adversely impacted by negative publicity
stemming from high-profile incidents like that in Ferguson? Organizational justice theory offers
a sound framework for such an understanding (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Sheppard,
Lewicki, & Minton, 1992). Within the business management literature, studies have shown that
greater perceived supervisor organizational justice is associated with beneficial work-related
outcomes such as increased productivity and greater organizational commitment among
employees (Colquitt et al., 2001). And although relatively few studies have applied the
organizational justice framework to the study of police behavior, the available evidence suggests
that officers who perceive their supervisors as being fair are more likely to identify with their
organization, comply with procedures, and hold more favorable attitudes toward community
policing, procedural justice, and the public more generally (Bradford, Quinton, Myhill, & Porter,
2013; Myhill & Bradford, 2013; Tankebe, 2014). On the other hand, officers who believe their
supervisors are unfair express less trust in their agency (Wolfe & Nix, 2016b) and are more
likely to engage in misconduct (Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). It is with these results in mind that we
argue organizational justice may also be associated with less sensitivity to negative publicity
stemming from Ferguson-related public discontent. Officers who feel fairly and respectfully
treated by their supervisors may be partially shielded from the effects of negative press
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surrounding their occupation. This is particularly important in agencies across the US that may
not have experienced a high-profile police shooting but are nevertheless dealing with the fallout
of such events in other jurisdictions. Such organizational justice likely communicates to officers
that they can trust their agency and supervisors and that they will be there to support them in the
face of public scrutiny.
Accordingly, the present study considered whether perceived organizational justice was
associated with several different indicators or manifestations of the Ferguson Effect. We
accomplished this using a survey of sheriff’s deputies (N = 510) employed by an agency in a
southeastern US metropolis. Multivariate regression equations were estimated to determine the
extent to which organizational justice was associated with sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect and
to rule out the possible confounding influence of other individual traits (e.g., self-legitimacy).
Our findings provide valuable insight for police executives who wish to protect their officers
from the public outrage surrounding their profession in the post-Ferguson era of policing. In this
way we are not interested in finding ways for officers and their agencies to skirt accountability
for wrong-doing. Rather, the overarching goal of this study was to provide empirical evidence
concerning the type of police supervisor actions that can help ensure officers do not become less
motivated, withdraw from their duties, or become less effective cops because of the threat of
media scrutiny and cell phone video recording. The implications of this study are important from
a police policy standpoint but also because internal fairness within a police agency may
ultimately impact public safety by creating better street cops.
The Ferguson Effect
Dating back to the summer of 2014, there have been several highly publicized fatal
encounters between white police officers and unarmed black citizens. The first occurred in Staten
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Island, NY, when Eric Garner died after being placed in a choke hold by NYPD officers. A
bystander captured the incident on video – which included Garner saying multiple times “I can’t
breathe” – and it ultimately went viral on the internet. Shortly thereafter, in Ferguson, MO,
unarmed Michael Brown was shot and killed by Officer Darren Wilson. This encounter was not
captured on video, but several witnesses claimed that Brown had his arms raised over his head as
if to be surrendering when he was shot. Although the officer’s use of force was later ruled
justified by the US Department of Justice (i.e., evidence suggested that Brown attempted to grab
the officer’s gun), the incident sparked civil unrest that lasted several weeks in Ferguson and
captured extraordinary media attention.
Eight months later, in North Charleston, SC, cellphone video emerged of Walter Scott
being shot five times in the back as he was fleeing Officer Michael Slager, who has since been
indicted for murder and is awaiting trial. Just one week after Scott’s death, Freddie Gray went
into a coma while being transported by a Baltimore Police van for possession of an illegal
switchblade. The media suggested Gray (who died from his injuries one week later) had been the
victim of a “rough ride,” and six officers were ultimately indicted for various charges including
false imprisonment (the knife turned out to be a pocket knife) and manslaughter.1 Days after
Gray’s funeral, televised protests in downtown Baltimore turned violent: rocks were thrown,
fires were started, patrol cars were destroyed, and many people (including police officers)
sustained injuries. The rioting eventually forced the governor of Maryland to declare a state of
emergency and call in the National Guard.

1

Officers Nero and Goodson were found not guilty of all charges on May 23, 2016 and June 23, 2016, respectively.
At the time of this writing, the other four officers are still awaiting trial (including Officer Porter, whose first trial
resulted in a mistrial due to a hung jury).
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Though allegations of excessive use of force against unarmed black citizens are nothing
new (e.g., Rodney King in Los Angeles), these and related events have resulted in unprecedented
levels of police scrutiny in recent months (Weitzer, 2015). This is due in large part to the advent
of social media and the ease with which citizens can record police behavior on cell phones and
upload to the Internet for millions to view. Such continuous negative publicity surrounding the
police at a national level has led some to argue that the police are withdrawing from their duties
in order to avoid being the next viral video on YouTube (Martinez, 2015; Sutton, 2015) – an
argument that has become known as the “Ferguson Effect.”2 One month after the Baltimore riots,
the Wall Street Journal published an op-ed by Heather Mac Donald (2015), in which she argued
that crime increases being experienced in several major US cities were precursors to a
nationwide crime wave that is the direct result of the Ferguson Effect and de-policing. Top law
enforcement officials such as St. Louis Chief Sam Dotson (who coined the term “Ferguson
Effect”), FBI Director James Comey and DEA Chief Chuck Rosenberg, city mayors such as
Rahm Emmanuel, and others have all echoed concerns over de-policing stemming from the
Ferguson Effect.
The Evidence Concerning the Ferguson Effect
Until recently, the Ferguson Effect debate has been “long on anecdotes and speculation
and short on data” (Pyrooz et al., 2016:3). For example, the FBI Director warned of the Ferguson
Effect and President Obama argued it may not exist, but both suggested we need data to answer
such questions. To determine whether Ferguson was associated with changes in crime rates at the
national level, Pyrooz and his co-authors analyzed monthly UCR Part I offenses in 81 large US

Others, including NYPD Commissioner William Bratton, have referenced a “YouTube Effect,” which similarly
refers to police officers withdrawing from their duties out of a fear of being captured on the next video to go viral on
the Internet (Davis, 2015).
2

8

cities 12 months before and 12 months after the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson. They
found no evidence of a post-Ferguson change in overall, violent, or property crime trends –
although disaggregated analyses suggested that robbery rates were on the rise in the postFerguson era. Importantly, they did reveal that a handful of cities—those with higher than
average crime rates, larger African-American populations, and greater police per capita—
experienced increases in violent crime starting at about the same time as the Ferguson incident.
Substantively, however, the magnitude of such crime rate changes was quite small. For example,
in the “Ferguson Effect cities” it would take nearly two years to witness a one-unit increase in
homicides, on average. A Ferguson Effect? Probably – but certainly nothing to sound alarm bells
over.3
What Pyrooz and colleagues’ analyses could not speak to, however, was whether
Ferguson and related events have resulted in de-policing. In a recent report for the 21st Century
Cities Initiative at Johns Hopkins University, Morgan and Pally (2016) explored this possibility
in Baltimore by examining trends in both crime and arrest data from 2010 to 2015, which
captures the deaths of both Michael Brown and Freddie Gray. With respect to crime, the authors
found that shootings, homicides, robberies, carjackings, and automobile thefts all increased in the
three months following Gray’s death. Yet despite these crime increases, the arrest count over the
same period declined by 30% (in fact, arrests had been declining during the 8 months prior to
Gray’s arrest, which is perhaps attributable to the events surrounding Brown’s death in
Ferguson). Thus, the authors found that negative publicity surrounding Gray’s death in Baltimore
was associated with both increases in crime and a slowdown in police activity. Together, these

Rosenfeld (2016:2) has since concluded that the homicide increase in 56 large US cities “was real and nearly
unprecedented,” though most of the overall increase was constrained to 10 cities which had experienced, on average,
a 33% increase in homicides. While there are several possible explanations for why these cities experienced such
drastic homicide increases, the Ferguson Effect is the most likely, according to Rosenfeld.
3
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studies suggest that there is no Ferguson Effect on national crime rates; however, negative
publicity stemming from events like Ferguson and Baltimore do appear to have an effect on
police behaviors. Importantly, such an effect seems to occur regardless of whether a city has
experienced a high-profile incident of its own (e.g., Baltimore’s de-policing after Brown’s death,
but before Gray’s death).
Equally important is the possibility that, in response to both negative media attention and
public discontent, the police have begun to question the confidence they have in their own moral
authority, or self-legitimacy (see Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012). Indeed, Nix and Wolfe (2015)
demonstrated that reduced motivation due to negative publicity in the months following
Ferguson was associated with lower levels of self-legitimacy among officers in their sample.
This is especially troubling given that higher levels of self-legitimacy have been linked to greater
organizational commitment and less dependence on physical force to gain compliance (Tankebe
& Meško, 2015), as well as greater commitment to using procedural fairness (Bradford &
Quinton, 2014).
Similarly, Wolfe and Nix (2016a) found that officers who felt less motivated as a result
of negative publicity surrounding law enforcement indicated less willingness to engage in
community partnerships – a key component of policing in the community-problem solving era.
Importantly, however, the study also revealed that officers’ lack of willingness to work with
community members was more a result of perceived supervisor unfairness and lack of selflegitimacy. Finally, some commentators and law enforcement officials have proclaimed that
policing has become more dangerous in the wake of Ferguson due to officers being more hesitant
to use force when the situation calls for it (Canterbury, 2016; Reese, 2014; Safir, 2015). Some
have even suggested that the number of police officers being assaulted and killed in the line of
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duty has increased sharply (Hattem, 2015), though empirical evidence suggests otherwise
(Maguire, Nix, & Campbell, forthcoming).
Anecdotes and opinions concerning the Ferguson Effect abound and many cops argue
that it is real. The problem with most media attention concerning the Ferguson Effect is that it is
treated often as a singular phenomenon. The reality is that there may be many Ferguson Effects.
While research suggests that a Ferguson Effect on crime rates appears to be confined to select
cities in the US, there are many other consequences experienced by officers that have resulted
from negative publicity. In this way, empirical evidence confirms much of the conjecture and
anecdotes. Some cops are less motivated and confident, view the job as more dangerous, are
arresting fewer people for minor offenses, and are more hesitant to engage with community
members in the post-Ferguson era. Again, it is important to emphasize that social media
contagion has allowed Ferguson-type incidents to be experienced in agencies that have not
experienced their own high-profile police shooting (see Pyrooz et al., 2016). Ultimately, social
media has created a situation where citizens and officers alike can reap the negative effects of
such incidents regardless of geographical proximity. Officers need to be held accountable for
wrongdoing but this evidence suggests that a sizeable portion of police officers are feeling the ill
effects of intense public scrutiny. These are important observations not only for police agencies
but the communities they serve. Ultimately, officers impacted in this manner are less effective
than they should be. This has direct implications for the safety of citizens and the wellbeing of
communities. Unfortunately, we know very little about what factors are associated with officers’
sensitivity to Ferguson-related negative publicity. Organizational justice theory offers one
possibility for us to begin to establish an evidence-based understanding of the phenomenon.
Organizational Justice
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Organizational justice theory has a long history in the business management literature
(see, e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988). In fact, several meta-analyses have demonstrated strong
empirical support for the conclusion that employees are more likely to engage in a wide-range of
beneficial work-related behaviors when they perceive their organization as fair (Cohen-Charash
& Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001). There are three primary components to organizational
justice, the first of which is distributive fairness. Employees base their evaluations of supervisors
partially on the extent to which they perceive organizational outcomes, such as salary and
promotion decisions, as being distributed evenhandedly across the organization (i.e., such
decisions are not based on individual characteristics or “who you know”). The second
component, interactional justice, concerns the degree to which employees feel they are treated
with respect and politeness by supervisors. The third, and most important, element of
organizational justice is procedural fairness. Over and above outcome-based equity, employees
look for supervisory decisions and organizational processes to be handled in procedurally just
manners—decisions are clearly explained, unbiased, and allow for employee input.
Given the overlap between the management of cooperate businesses and police
organizations, a wave of organizational justice research in policing contexts has occurred in the
past few years. Wolfe and Piquero (2011), for example, showed that officers were less likely to
engage in misconduct when they viewed their agency and supervisors as organizationally fair.
Other research has echoed this finding and revealed further beneficial outcomes that stem from
organizational justice. Officers are more likely to identify with their agency and its goals, hold
more favorable views of community policing (and the public more broadly), use procedural
justice, and have higher levels of self-legitimacy when they perceive their supervisors as
organizationally fair (Bradford & Quinton, 2014; Bradford et al., 2014; Myhill & Bradford,
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2013; Tankebe, 2014; Tankebe & Meško, 2015; Tyler, Callahan, & Frost, 2007). Relatedly, but
using slightly different terminology, recent studies have underscored the importance of “internal
procedural justice” within police departments (Trinkner, Tyler, & Goff, 2016; Van Craen, 2016).
The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) even included internal procedural
justice as a cornerstone of building trust within the community—trust must start from the inside
before being sustained in communities. Taken together, the literature demonstrates that officers
who feel their supervisors are procedurally fair, distribute outcomes based on objective criteria,
and treat subordinates with respect, engage in more organizational citizenship behaviors and
harbor positive attitudes that are beneficial to both the agencies they work for and the
communities they serve.
With such results in mind, there are several reasons why we would expect organizational
justice to be associated with less sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect. First, it is important to
emphasize that we view sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect as a negative work-related outcome
given the many potential negative consequences of such an orientation. If officers feel less
motivated or believe citizens have worse opinions of the police in the wake of Ferguson, for
example, they may be less likely to engage in successful crime reduction strategies such as using
procedural justice, community-oriented policing, or order-maintenance policing. Empirical
evidence supports this conclusion (Morgan & Pally, 2016; Wolfe & Nix, 2016a). On the other
hand, officers may be protected from such negative outcomes when they are treated in a fair
manner by their supervisors. Organizational justice communicates to individual officers that their
supervisors and the broader agency have their back—they are there to support them.4

An anonymous reviewer pointed out that a supervisor might also have an officer’s back when s/he commits
wrongdoing – which is certainly plausible. This would not be a function of organizational justice, but rather the blue
code of silence (see Skolnick, 2002) which is particularly problematic for use of force investigations and the
4
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Furthermore, being treated fairly and respectfully by supervisors lets officers know that they
have a voice in their agency and they are a part of the department, not simply a subordinate
employee. Most importantly, supervisors who use organizational fairness are indicating to
officers that “we are in this together” regarding public scrutiny and Ferguson-related negative
media attention. This sends an important psychological message to officers that if something
does go wrong it will be dealt with fairly.
It is important to determine whether organizational justice is related to officers’
sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect because of relatively easy-to-implement policy implications
that would follow. Organizational fairness can be used as a management philosophy by ensuring
that supervisors treat officers in a procedurally fair, unbiased, and respectful manner, and by
offering them a voice in decisions. In turn, this strategy can help stave off any negative
psychological effects of media and public scrutiny. This is important in itself but using
organizationally fair supervision techniques also has a number of other benefits that come with it
such as creating officers who are more committed to and trusting of their agency, more willing to
work with the community and use procedural justice, and less likely to engage in
counterproductive work behaviors (e.g., misconduct). Organizational justice is also likely to help
lead to needed reforms in agencies with strained police-community relations. In short, the
organizational justice return on investment is great.
The Current Study
Accordingly, the present study explored whether officers’ perceptions of organizational
fairness within their agency was associated with their sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect. We
examined this question with a survey of sheriff’s deputies that was conducted about six months

legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public. Our use of the term “support” deals does not include such
instances where a supervisor knowingly covers up officer misconduct.
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after Michael Brown was killed in Ferguson. This was a time period when the “Ferguson Effect”
was receiving a great deal of attention on social and conventional media sites and when high
ranking officials were warning of the ill-effects of the phenomenon (see, e.g., Anderson, 2014;
Frizell, 2014; Matt, 2014; Reese, 2014). We use a variety of measures to explore officers’
attitudes concerning various possible manifestations of the Ferguson Effect. The purpose of the
present study was to provide a theoretically sophisticated understanding of the correlates of
sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect in order to provide evidence-based police policy
recommendations. The overarching goal was to further demonstrate the utility of organizational
fairness within police agencies.
Methods
Data
Shortly after the beginning of 2015, we surveyed 510 full-time, sworn sheriff’s deputies
employed by an agency in a southeastern US metropolis (response rate = 85%).5 The survey was
administered online at a password-protected website and participation was encouraged by
ensuring anonymity and securing the endorsement of the agency’s Deputy Advisory Council – a
group of deputies who represent the interest of their colleagues and is very respected throughout
the agency. As is typical of survey research, some respondents returned incomplete surveys,
which resulted in a small amount of missing data. We employed multiple imputation using
chained equations (MICE; 10 imputations) to handle missing data, which is available in Stata 14
(Andridge & Little, 2010; Fuller & Kim, 2005).

This agency – one of the largest in its state – serves Marie County (pseudonym), which covers over 750 square
miles and is home to approximately 401,000 citizens. According to the most recent US Census data, the racial
makeup of Marie County is roughly 48% white, 47% black, and 5% other. About one-fourth of the population is
under the age of 18. The median household income is $48,674, but note that 16% of the population is living in
poverty.
5
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Dependent Variables
We measured sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect with five separate dependent variables
meant to capture various consequences attributable to the Ferguson controversy. Specifically, we
considered whether the respondent felt s/he has been impacted, his/her colleagues have been
affected, and the public has been affected by the Ferguson controversy, respectively, in the wake
of Michael Brown’s death and subsequent related events in the ensuing months.
Ferguson effect on self. We presented respondents with eight statements regarding the
extent to which negative publicity had impacted them in the 6 months leading up to the survey
(the survey was administered approximately 6 months after Brown’s death in Ferguson). For
example, respondents were asked to indicate their level agreement (1 = strongly disagree, 2 =
disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree) that over the past 6 months, negative
publicity surrounding law enforcement had “made it more dangerous to be a law enforcement
officer,” “made it less enjoyable to have a career in law enforcement,” and “made it more
difficult for you to be motivated at work.” A complete list of the items used to measure the effect
of negative publicity on respondents is available in the Appendix. Principal components analysis
(PCA) with varimax rotation demonstrated that the eight items loaded onto two distinct
components – one pertaining to less motivation (λ = 4.18, loadings > .66) and the other to
increased danger on the job (λ = 1.06, loadings > .60). Each component demonstrated adequate
internal consistency (motivation α = .87, danger α = .71) and, therefore, were combined into
separate additive scales. Less motivation ranges from 5 to 25, with higher scores indicating the
respondent felt less motivated to do his/her job as a result of negative publicity over the prior 6
months. Increased danger ranges from 3 to 15, with higher scores reflecting a belief on the part
of the respondent that law enforcement had become more dangerous as a result of negative
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publicity following Ferguson and related events. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in
the analyses are presented in Table 1.
--Table 1 about here-Ferguson effect on colleagues. It is possible that regardless of whether officers believed
negative publicity stemming from the Ferguson controversy had affected them, they might
believe that it had influenced other police officers, including their colleagues. This is an
important consideration given that police officers routinely rely on their colleagues for backup.
For example, officers may hesitate to stop suspicious persons if they feel their colleagues are
reluctant to use force when it may be necessary. To capture this sentiment, we asked respondents
to indicate their agreement (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) with statements
regarding whether negative publicity surrounding law enforcement in the previous 6 months had:
(1) made it more difficult for coworkers to do their job, (2) made it more difficult for coworkers
to be motivated at work, (3) caused coworkers to be less proactive on the job than they were in
the past, and (4) caused coworkers to be more apprehensive about using force even though it
may be necessary. PCA suggested the four items loaded onto a single component (λ = 2.67,
loadings > .76) and Cronbach’s alpha indicated strong internal consistency (α = .83).
Accordingly, we combined the items into an additive scale ranging from 4 to 20 with higher
scores reflecting a belief that negative publicity surrounding law enforcement had negatively
affected colleagues.
Ferguson effect on citizens’ views. It is also possible that, in response to the Fergusonrelated controversy, officers have come to believe that citizens’ attitudes toward the police have
worsened (see Culhane et al., 2016). If so, this could have important ramifications for the police.
For example, it may lead to further immersion into the “us versus them” nature of the police
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subculture (Chan, 1996, Neiderhoffer, 1967; Waddington, 1999), which could result in less
willingness to work with the community to solve problems (Braga et al., 2001). To measure the
extent to which our sample felt this way about US citizens, respondents were asked to indicate
their level of agreement (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) with the following
statement: “In general, US citizens’ views of the police have gotten worse in the last 6 months.”
Similarly, we asked respondents how much they agreed that “Over the past 6 months, Marie
County (pseudonym) residents’ perceptions of law enforcement have gotten worse.” This item
was used as a fifth dependent variable, Local citizens, in order to consider the possibility that
respondents felt local citizens’ views differed from those of US citizens more broadly.
Independent Variable
Organizational justice. The independent variable of the present study was organizational
justice, which we measured with 18 items intended to capture each component of the construct:
procedural, distributive, and interactional justice. All items were measured on the same 5-point
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Procedural justice was measured by
asking respondents the extent to which they agreed with statements such as “Command staff
clearly explains the reasons for their decisions” and “My agency’s policies are designed to allow
employees to have a voice in agency decisions (e.g., assignment changes, discipline).”
Distributive justice was measured with statements including “Landing a good assignment in my
agency is based on whom you know (reverse coded)” and “Command staff treats employees the
same regardless of their gender.” Finally, interactional justice was measured via statements like
“Command staff treats employees with kindness and consideration” and “Generally, command
staff treats employees with respect” (a complete list of the items used to measure organizational
justice is available in the Appendix). These items were consistent with those used in prior
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research (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001) and PCA indicated that they
loaded onto a single component (λ = 10.75, factor loadings > .65). The items also demonstrated
strong internal consistency (α = .96) and, accordingly, were combined into an additive scale with
higher scores reflecting greater perceived organizational justice.
Controls
In an effort to generate unbiased estimates of the effect of organizational justice on each
of the outcome variables, we controlled for several individual officer characteristics. To aid in
maintaining respondents’ anonymity, we measured age categorically (1=21 to 30, 2=31 to 40,
3=41 to 50, and 4=51 or older). Gender (1=male), race (1=minority), and education (1=four-year
degree or higher) were dummy coded, as were rank (1=deputy), experience (1=more than 10
years), and military background (1=yes). Consistent with the agency’s demographic
characteristics, about 76% of respondents were male and 31% were a minority. Finally, we
controlled for respondents’ level of self-legitimacy because prior studies have demonstrated its
association with a number of desirable officer attitudes and behaviors (Bradford & Quinton,
2014; Tankebe & Meško, 2015; Wolfe & Nix, 2016a, b). Respondents were asked to indicate
their level of agreement with the following five statements: “I have confidence in the authority
vested in me as a law enforcement officer,” “As a law enforcement officer, I believe I occupy a
position of special importance in society,” “I believe people should always do what I tell them as
long as my orders are lawful,” “I am confident I have enough authority to do my job well,” and
“I believe law enforcement is capable of providing security for all citizens of this county”
(Tankebe, 2014). PCA indicated that the items loaded onto a single component (λ = 2.32;
loadings > 0.56) and Cronbach’s alpha suggested adequate internal consistency (α = .71). As
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such, the items were summed into a scale ranging from 5 to 25, with higher scores indicating a
greater sense of self-legitimacy.
Analytic Strategy
The analysis involved the estimation of a series of multivariate regression equations that
examined the role of organizational justice on officers’ sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect as
indicated by five different outcome variables. Specifically, Models 1 through 3 in Table 2 used
ordinary least squares regression (OLS) to assess whether organizational justice was associated
with less motivation, increased danger, or a greater sense that public scrutiny had negatively
impacted respondents’ colleagues in the months following the incident in Ferguson, net of
statistical controls. OLS was used because these dependent variables approximated normality
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013).6 Conversely, ordered logistic regression was used to estimate the
relationship between organizational justice and respondents’ perceptions of whether US citizens’
or local residents’ views of the police had gotten worse in the wake of Ferguson in Models 4 and
5, respectively.7
Results
Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 were concerned with the extent to which respondents felt they
had been directly affected by negative publicity stemming from the Ferguson controversy. Model

6

Less motivation: skewness = 0.37, kurtosis = 2.51; Increased danger: skewness = -0.53, kurtosis = 3.02; Affected
colleagues: skewness = 0.13, kurtosis = 2.84.
7
The parallel-lines assumption (i.e., proportional odds) is often violated when using ordered logistic regression
because one or more coefficients in an equation may differ across values of the outcome measure (Williams, 2006).
We used the Brant (1990) test to assess whether the regression coefficients in the ordered logistic models were
similar across the response categories for each of the dependent variables (see also, Long & Freese, 2006).
According to this test, the parallel-lines assumption was violated in Models 4 and 5 in Table 2. We reestimated these
equations using Stata’s gologit2 command which allows some regression coefficients to be the same across all
values of a dependent variable and others to differ. A multinomial logit would allow all parameters to vary across
the dependent variable but such an equation would lack interpretability and parsimony (Breen, Luijkx, Müller, &
Pollak, 2009; Williams, 2006). The generalized ordered logit robustness checks revealed substantively similar
results as those presented below. For ease of interpretation, we report the ordered logit findings.
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1 presents the results of an OLS model that regressed less motivation onto organizational justice
and nine control variables. For starters, about 29% of the variation in less motivation was
accounted for by the model. Most importantly, deputies who perceived greater organizational
justice on the part of their agency and its command staff were significantly less likely to report
experiencing reduced motivation due to negative publicity surrounding law enforcement in the
six months following Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson (b = -.18, p < .01). In other words,
deputies who felt their supervisors treated them fairly and with respect were less likely to
experience reduced motivation from the Ferguson Effect.
In Model 2, the increased danger scale was regressed onto organizational justice along
with each of our control variables. The model accounted for a moderate amount of variation in
this measure of the Ferguson Effect (R² = .15). Organizational justice (b = -.07, p <.01) was
significantly and negatively associated with a belief among respondents that law enforcement has
become more dangerous in the post-Ferguson era. Here again, organizational justice on the part
of supervisors seemed to protect deputies from the negative consequences of the Ferguson
Effect. It is also worth noting that compared to white respondents, minorities (b = -.67, p < .05)
were significantly less likely to report an increased sense of danger in law enforcement. Given
that much of the negative publicity surrounding the Ferguson controversy has dealt with the
shooting of unarmed black citizens by white police officers, it is perhaps not surprising that
minority officers are less likely to believe law enforcement has gotten more dangerous.
--Table 2 about here-Model 3 focused on the extent to which respondents believed their colleagues had been
impacted by negative publicity stemming from Ferguson. Our third dependent variable – affected
colleagues – was regressed onto organizational justice and each of the control variables. The
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model explained 21% of the variation in the outcome variable. Once again, the organizational
justice coefficient (b = -.10, p < .01) was negative and statistically significant. Deputies who
believed their agency and its command staff was fair and respectful were less likely to feel that
their colleagues have been affected by negative publicity in the months following Ferguson.
Models 4 and 5 explored the extent to which respondents believed the Ferguson
controversy had influenced citizens’ attitudes toward the police. Using ordered logistic
regression, Model 4 regressed our fourth dependent variable, affected US citizens, onto
organizational justice and the controls. As expected, organizational justice (b = -.03, p < .01) was
significantly and negatively associated with the belief that US citizens’ views of the police had
gotten worse in the six months leading up to the survey. Those deputies who perceived greater
organizational fairness within their agency were less likely to feel that citizens’ views of the
police have gotten worse. In this way, organizationally fair treatment by supervisors seems to
protect officers from cynical orientations about citizens. In Model 5, we explored a similar
question but focused more specifically on respondents’ beliefs about local citizens’ views of the
police. Our final Ferguson Effect variable – affected local citizens – was regressed onto
organizational justice along with the controls. Again organizational justice (b = -.06, p < .01) was
significantly and negatively associated with the outcome. That is, deputies who perceived greater
organizational justice within their agency were less likely to believe that local citizens’ views of
the police had worsened in the 6 months since Ferguson. With the findings in hand, we now turn
to a discussion of the implications surrounding the results.
Discussion
There has been much debate over the existence of a Ferguson Effect on US police over
the last year and a half. Although the notion that the Ferguson Effect is responsible for a
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nationwide crime trend has been debunked (Pyrooz et al., 2016; but see Rosenfeld, 2016), a
growing body of evidence suggests that cops have indeed been impacted by continued negative
publicity (Morgan & Pally, 2016; Nix & Wolfe, 2015; Wolfe & Nix, 2016a). If in fact police
officers across the country are less willing to be proactive on the job in the post-Ferguson era,
this is a serious problem that we need to know more about. For example, reductions in proactive
stops, order-maintenance policing, and other strategies known to be effective in crime reduction
may have a more lagged effect on crime problems in particular communities than recent research
has been able to observe. As such, a question we felt was important to ask was: what factors are
associated with officer sensitivity to negative publicity stemming from the Ferguson
controversy? This study suggested that respondents’ perceived organizational fairness on the part
of their supervisors was significantly associated with less sensitivity to five manifestations of the
Ferguson Effect. Officers who felt their agency was fair were less likely to report (1) being
unmotivated, (2) that law enforcement has become more dangerous, (3) that their colleagues
have been impacted by negative publicity, and (4) that citizens’ attitudes (both nationally and
locally) toward the police have worsened. With these results in mind, several issues warrant
more detailed discussion.
Organizational justice extends beyond the walls of the police department and ultimately
protects cops. Respondents who indicated that their agency and command staff are fair,
objective, honest, and respectful were less sensitive to negative publicity surrounding their
profession in the wake of Michael Brown’s death in Ferguson. This finding adds to a growing
body of literature which suggests that internal fairness produces beneficial outcomes for
individual officers, agencies, and the public at large (Bradford & Quinton, 2014; Trinkner et al.,
2016; Wolfe & Nix, 2016a; Wolfe & Piquero, 2011). We implore researchers to continue
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exploring organizational fairness in the police context – perhaps, for example, as it relates to
important issues such as embracing evidence-based practices and adopting new technologies
such as body-worn cameras. It is probable that agencies which emphasize internal fairness are
more likely to generate buy-in from line-level officers on such matters.
Academic research on the Ferguson Effect has dramatically improved our understanding
of the phenomenon. Simply put, scientific evidence is more valuable than conjecture. Research
has revealed that there are important Ferguson-related effects on officers’ orientations toward
their job and de-policing behaviors. It is also possible that the negative publicity surrounding
deadly force incidents such as those in Ferguson and Baltimore have thrust the police into a
legitimacy crisis. That is, in response to the deaths of several unarmed black citizens in recent
years, US citizens may have begun to challenge the legitimacy of the police (see Bottoms &
Tankebe, 2012; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Any look at social media outlets will clearly
reveal that a sizable portion of the American public is questioning the legitimacy of police use of
force, particularly in minority communities. A recent experiment by Culhane and colleagues
(2016) supports this argument empirically by showing that citizens are less likely to view police
shootings as justified in the post-Ferguson era. This evidence suggests that the Ferguson-related
incidents have also negatively impacted citizens’ orientations toward law enforcement. At this
point, we need more theoretically-grounded and policy-relevant research on the legitimacy crisis
that may be facing American police. The implications of reduced legitimacy are potentially far
reaching and may impact police-community relations and crime for generations to come if not
adequately addressed (Wolfe, McLean, & Pratt, 2016).
This issue brings us to the policy implications of our findings. In the face of public
scrutiny of immense proportions, law enforcement agencies are in a position where they must
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act. Our findings underscore the importance of organizational fairness from supervisors and
agencies more broadly. This is not necessarily surprising given that decades of research has
demonstrated the role of organizational justice in the context of various employment and
subordinate settings (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt et al., 2001; Reisig & Bain,
2016). The policy implication of this observation is straightforward: to minimize the impact of
negative publicity and the Ferguson Effect on officers, agencies must strive to use organizational
justice as a guiding principle of their managerial philosophy. Ensuring that internal policies and
procedures are fair, disciplinary proceedings and hiring/promotion decisions are based on
objective indicators, allowing subordinate officers a voice in agency decision-making, and
treating subordinates with respect and dignity are some of the ways in which police supervisors
can cultivate a climate of organizational fairness in their agencies. Organizationally fair
treatment sends the message to officers that the agency and its supervisors has their back and
communicates to them that they are part of the agency (rather than simply a subordinate
employee). Ultimately, this allows an agency to create a situation where officers believe that if
something unfortunate occurs on the street, such as having to shoot a civilian, their agency will
support them, provide a fair investigation process, and not make decisions based on political
pressure or public scrutiny. It is important to note, however, that political pressure is often an
inescapable aspect of law enforcement. As such, we need to keep in mind that organizational
justice on the part of police agencies cannot be fully separated from the efforts on the part of
local governments (e.g., mayors and city councils) to do the same thing. Arbitrary decisions from
local government officials have the power to undermine organizational justice within police
agencies. Additionally, advocating for the use of organizational justice does not absolve officers
or agencies from misconduct and poor community relations. Indeed, police reform is needed in
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the US, particularly in certain communities. Ensuring organizational fairness within an agency is
one prong to such reform.
Organizational justice training programs need to be developed with an eye toward
helping agencies achieve these goals. Several training platforms organized by both government
(e.g., the Office of Community-Oriented Policing) and private entities have already emerged.
When such training is implemented within agencies, there is a need for evaluation research
dedicated toward understanding what works with such programs and what does not. Owens and
colleagues (2016) recently conducted an experiment in which they successfully implemented a
low-cost procedural justice-centered training of officers in Seattle. Results revealed that trained
officers were less likely to resolve incidents with arrest or force. An important component of this
intervention included organizationally fair treatment by supervisors. More training programs and
related evaluation research need to focus on organizational justice within police agencies in the
future.
The importance of organizational justice within police departments cannot be overstated.
Good policing starts inside the walls of police agencies. Simply put, we cannot expect officers to
engage in procedural justice on the street if they do not receive such treatment from their own
supervisors. Internal procedural justice provides a model for police officers that is likely to
translate into interactions they have with citizens (Bradford & Quinton, 2014; Van Craen, 2016).
Accordingly, organizational justice has direct public safety consequences. We know that
procedural justice policing is safer for cops and community members alike (i.e., as opposed to
relying on coercive force) and causes citizens to more regularly voluntarily comply with the law
(see Tyler, 1990). Our findings suggest that organizational justice may also create a situation
where cops will not hesitate to do things on the street that we know are effective at combating
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crime (e.g., work with community members). Ultimately, this means that organizational justice
translates into safer communities.
While our study is the first of its kind to demonstrate theoretically-salient and policyrelevant results concerning the correlates of sensitivity to the Ferguson effect, there were several
things we could not do that represent opportunities for future work. First, our measure of the
extent to which respondents’ colleagues have been impacted by negative publicity may suffer
from projection. Psychological projection theory offers a reason to believe that while
respondents might be hesitant to indicate having been affected by the Ferguson controversy, they
may project such feelings onto their peers (Baumeister, Dale, & Sommer, 1998; Boman et al.,
2011). Unfortunately, we are unable to determine whether this occurred with some of our
respondents. One avenue for future research that may prove fruitful is the collection of social
network data to gauge the extent to which peer effects shape sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect.
Second, like most prior studies, ours was carried out using cross-sectional survey data from a
single agency. As such, the generalizability of our findings may be limited because (1) we were
unable to determine whether respondents’ attitudes have truly changed post-Ferguson and (2) we
cannot be certain that our findings from this particular agency are generalizable to officers
working in other agencies or other regions of the country. At the same time, however, it is
important to note that our Ferguson Effect measures were retrospective in nature by asking
respondents to indicate how events in the previous six months had impacted them. Future
research using longitudinal designs and/or conducted with multiple agencies would certainly be
fruitful on both theoretical and practical levels.
In the end, organizational justice should be a cornerstone of all police departments. The
beneficial outcomes – to officers, agencies, and the public – are numerous. Fortunately, agencies
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can implement organizational fairness at little cost. The police profession will undoubtedly face
continued public scrutiny in the current era of social media, especially given that officers have
the unique power to arrest and use physical (even deadly) force. In this way, the importance of
our findings are not restricted to reducing sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect. Rather, our findings
suggest that organizational fairness can encourage officers to continue performing their duties
when such public scrutiny does occur. Ultimately, this translates into better cops and safer
communities.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
N

M

S.D.

Min

Max

Dependent variables
Less motivation
Increased danger
Affected colleagues
Affected US citizens
Affected local citizens

489
488
490
504
503

12.85
10.82
11.74
4.05
2.84

4.79
2.52
3.39
.91
.99

5
3
4
1
1

25
15
20
5
5

Independent variable
Organizational justice

426

63.87

13.54

18

90

Controls
Self-legitimacy
Age
Male
Minority
Four year degree
Deputya
Patrol
Experience ≥ 10 years
Military

475
438
435
430
438
425
424
429
434

20.47
2.53
.76
.31
.57
.69
.39
.60
.39

2.89
1.03
--------

5
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

25
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

a

“Mid-level supervisor” is the reference category.
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Table 2. Sensitivity to Ferguson Effects.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
(OLS)
(OLS)
(OLS)
(Ordered Logistic)
(Ordered Logistic)
Less
Increased
Affected
Affected
Affected Local
Motivation
Danger
Colleagues
US Citizens
Citizens
b
b
b
b
b
β
β
β
OR
OR
(SE)
(SE)
(SE)
(SE)
(SE)
Organizational Justice
-.18**
-.50
-.07**
-.37
-.10**
-.42
-.03**
.97
-.06**
.94
(.02)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
(.01)
Self-legitimacy
-.10
-.06
.06
.06
-.07
-.06
.08*
1.08
.03
1.03
(.08)
(.05)
(.06)
(.04)
(.04)
Age
-.50
-.11
-.36*
-.15
-.33
-.10
.01
1.01
-.04
.96
(.27)
(.15)
(.19)
(.12)
(.13)
Male
-.63
-.05
-.05
-.01
-.46
-.06
-.78**
.46
-.31
.74
(.51)
(.30)
(.39)
(.28)
(.25)
Minority
-.83
-.08
-.67*
-.12
-.27
-.04
.11
1.11
.29
1.34
(.49)
(.28)
(.36)
(.23)
(.23)
Four year degree
.78
.08
.21
.04
.43
.06
.11
1.11
.30
1.35
(.46)
(.27)
(.32)
(.21)
(.21)
Deputy
-.88
-.08
-.81**
-.15
-.91*
-.12
-.44
.65
-.14
.87
(.53)
(.28)
(.35)
(.23)
(.22)
Patrol
-.15
-.02
-.27
-.05
-.02
.00
.30
1.35
.26
1.30
(.49)
(.27)
(.35)
(.23)
(.22)
Experience ≥ 10 years
.25
.03
-.29
-.06
-.26
-.04
-.39
.68
-.36
.70
(.61)
(.31)
(.42)
(.27)
(.27)
Military
.29
.03
.16
.03
.63
.09
-.23
.80
-.26
.77
(.48)
(.27)
(.35)
(.23)
(.22)
Intercept
28.08**
-15.92**
-21.28**
-----(1.97)
(1.19)
(1.42)
F-test
18.07**
8.85**
10.17**
3.76**
7.07**
2
a
a
a
b
R
.29
.15
.21
.05
.07b
N
369
364
370
374
373
Note: All models estimated using MICE (M = 10). Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (b), robust standard errors (SE), standardized regression
coefficients (β), and odds ratios (OR). *p < .05, ** p < .01
a
Mean Adjusted R2; b Mean McFadden’s R2
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Appendix: Organizational Justice and Ferguson Effect Items
Organizational Justice
My agency’s policies are designed to generate standards so that decisions can be made with
consistency.
My agency’s policies are designed to allow employees to have a voice in agency decisions (e.g.
assignment changes, discipline).
My agency’s performance evaluation system is fair.
My agency’s investigation of civilian complaints is fair.
I understand clearly what type of behavior will result in discipline within my agency.
Landing a good assignment in my agency is based on whom you know (reverse coded).
If you work hard, you can get ahead at this agency.
As an organization, my agency can be trusted to do what is right for the community.
I trust the direction that my department’s command staff is taking our agency.
I feel confident about top management’s skills.
Command staff considers employees’ viewpoints.
Command staff treats employees with kindness and consideration.
Command staff treats employees the same regardless of their gender.
Command staff treats employees the same regardless of their race or ethnicity.
Command staff clearly explains the reasons for their decisions.
Command staff clearly explains the reasons the agency makes policy changes.
Generally, command staff treats employees with respect.
I trust that command staff makes decisions that have the agency’s best interest in mind.
Ferguson Effects:
Less Motivation
[Over the past 6 months, negative publicity surrounding law enforcement has]
Made it more difficult for you to be motivated at work.
Caused you to be less proactive on the job than you were in the past.
Caused you to be more apprehensive about using force even though it may be necessary.
Negatively impacted the way you do your job.
Made it less enjoyable to have a career in law enforcement.
Increased Danger
[Over the past 6 months, negative publicity surrounding law enforcement has]
Made it more difficult to do your job.
Made it more dangerous to be a law enforcement officer.
Forced some US law enforcement agencies to make policy changes that ultimately threaten officer
safety.
Affected Colleagues
[Over the past 6 months, negative publicity surrounding law enforcement has]
Made it more difficult for your coworkers to do their job.
Made it difficult for your coworkers to be motivated at work.
Caused your coworkers to be less proactive on the job than they were in the past.
Caused your coworkers to be more apprehensive about using force even though it may be necessary.
Affected US Citizens
In general, US citizens’ views toward the police have gotten worse over the past 6 months.
Affected Local Citizens
Over the past 6 months, local citizens’ perceptions of law enforcement have gotten worse.

